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Introduction 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as the DPRK or North Korea) is 
an authoritarian one-party state under the rule of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).[1] The DPRK 
was established in 1948 under substantial influence of the Soviet Union, which invested Kim Il 
Sung as the leader of the new republic. Kim, who was only 33 years old and weak compared to 
his domestic political rivals at the time, was able to purge all adversaries and establish a cult of 
personality that is arguably unsurpassed in modern times. According to the 1998 DPRK Socialist 
Constitution, Kim Il Sung is the “eternal President of the Republic,” and the “founder of the 
immortal juche (chuch’e) idea.” Juche, which literally means “self-reliance,” was introduced in 
1955 and became the state ideology in the DPRK. Kim Il Sung’s unrivaled authority and longevity 
enabled him to transfer power to his son Kim Jong Il upon his death in July 1994.[2]  
Although the dynastic transfer of power was the first for a communist country, it is considered 
normal in a traditional neo-Confucian society. And despite DPRK claims that the KWP is a 
revolutionary mechanism for modernization, North Korea is very traditional in many respects, and 
the state arguably is more similar to a Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910) monarchy than a 
revolutionary socialist state. Despite widespread expectations that the KWP and Kim family 
dynasty would collapse in the wake of socialism’s demise in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, Kim Jong Il appears to enjoy firm political control even though the DPRK has lost its 
Soviet benefactor and suffered a massive famine and severe economic decline in the 1990s.  
International political change and domestic economic problems have forced Pyongyang to 
reassess its foreign policy and its policy towards the United States. North Korea is inherently 
insecure because of Korean division. Both Koreas claim to be the sole legitimate governments for 
the entire Korean peninsula and Korean people. This insecurity is exacerbated by the experience 
of the Korean War, Washington’s intervention in the war, the enduring U.S.-Republic of Korea 
(ROK or South Korea) alliance, and the collapse of the bipolar world system. Pyongyang’s 
foremost concern is resolving Korean division in its favor, but as explained below, DPRK policy 
towards the United States is an integral part of the country’s national strategy.  
North Korea’s Foreign Policy Institutions 
According to Article 17 of the 1998 Socialist Constitution, “independence, peace, and solidarity 
are the basic ideals of the foreign policy and the principles of external activities of the DPRK.” 
Furthermore, “the state shall establish diplomatic as well as political, economic and cultural 
relations with all friendly countries, on principles of complete equality, independence, mutual 
respect, noninterference in each other’s affairs, and mutual benefit.” However, the Korean 
Workers’ Party Bylaws are biased in prescribing how foreign policy should be conducted, calling 
for Third World solidarity and a united class struggle against international imperialism.[3] The 
party’s foreign policy prescriptions were easier to implement during the Cold War, but “anti-
imperialist” and anti-U.S. sentiments remain strong.  
Nominally, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) “exercises legislative authority and is the 
highest organ of state power in the DPRK.”[4] However, the 687-member legislature normally 
meets once a year for a few days in the spring to approve budgets and other governmental affairs 
that have been decided previously. The SPA Presidium and its approximate 15 members hold all 
SPA powers when the SPA is not in session, and these senior leaders hold de facto legislative 
power. According to the constitution, the SPA (and therefore, the SPA Presidium) has the 
authority to appoint and remove cabinet ministers—including the Foreign Minister—and other 
senior state officials. Senior government officials also hold high-level positions in the KWP, which 
reinforces the centralization of power to implement KWP policy objectives efficiently.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ostensibly is responsible for foreign policy, but the military and 
other economic ministries contribute to the policymaking process in the realms of international 
security and international economic relations. The ministry’s American Department is responsible 
for policy towards the United States. However, the KWP exerts control over DPRK foreign policy 
through the Central Committee’s Secretariat and Politburo. Kim Jong Il is the General-Secretary 
of the KWP and the sole member of the Politburo Standing Committee, which is authorized to act 
on behalf of the Politburo when it is not in session. The KWP also has an International 
Department and other party organizations tasked with specific international activities to implement 
North Korean foreign policy.[5] In sum, North Korea’s foreign policy and policy towards the United 
States is firmly under the control of Kim Jong Il; Kim certainly has a veto over any policy initiatives 
towards the United States. 
Economic Problems and the Rising Influence of the North Korean Military 
In the 1980s, the North Korean economy began to experience difficulties, which caused 
Pyongyang to reassess its international economic orientation.[6] In September 1984, the SPA 
Presidium passed the Joint Venture Law, the first in a series of legal and regulatory changes 
aimed at attracting foreign investment and transfers of foreign technology. These measures have 
been disappointing and have had virtually no effect on economic relations with the United States 
because of U.S. laws and regulations restricting economic transactions with the DPRK. 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s, DPRK policymakers began to realize the shortcomings of economic 
autarky and began to search for ways to obtain the benefits of an outward economic orientation 
while maintaining strict social and political control domestically—a difficult policy dilemma for 
Pyongyang.  
North Korea’s economic problems deteriorated further when the Soviet Union collapsed and 
Moscow discontinued subsidies to Pyongyang. North Korea suffered a huge terms of trade shock, 
which was exacerbated by devastating floods and a famine in the mid-1990s. North Korean 
policymakers were inept in adjusting to the economic shocks and the country continued most of 
its suboptimal agricultural and economic policies. The economic implosion of the 1990s 
undermined the state’s capacity to provide public goods, and the state’s food distribution system 
collapsed in much of the country. The KWP’s ineptitude in dealing with the economic problems 
and the failure to resolve the nation’s food shortages led Kim Jong Il to rely more and more on the 
Korean People’s Army (KPA) to manage state affairs.[7] 
In September 1998, the constitution was revised to usher in the Kim Jong Il era. The “Socialist 
Constitution” reflected the greater role of the military in state affairs by elevating the role of the 
National Defense Commission (NDC),[8] which has been chaired by Kim Jong Il since 1993. Kim 
has been using his positions as NDC chairman and KWP General-Secretary[9] to exert his 
control over North Korea’s militarized society and to address the challenges to social and political 
stability. Many analysts were puzzled that Kim Jong Il did not assume his father’s position of 
president following Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994, but Kim Jong Il skillfully appointed his 
loyalists into important positions prior to assuming power officially in September 1998. While 
many analysts view the Kim dynasty as rigid, incapable of change and therefore doomed, Kim 
Jong Il and his close associates have implemented two new state ideologies to coincide with the 
institutional changes of 1998.  
The term son’gun chŏngch’i (military first politics) first appeared in December 1997, but North 
Korea attributes 1995 as the beginning of “military first politics,” which the North Korean media 
now commonly calls “songun” or “songun politics” in its English publications.[10] Son’gun 
chŏngch’i is invoked to reassure North Koreans that Kim is dedicated to providing national 
security against external threats, and to reassure the military—a major component of Kim Jong 
Il’s coalition—that Kim and the KWP will take care of the military and give it a first cut at scarce 
economic resources. Son’gun chŏngch’i also enables Kim to reassure hard-line skeptics that 
security will not be compromised as the country adopts economic reforms.  
The second ideology—kangsŏngdaeguk—or establishing a “strong and prosperous country,” 
more broadly captures the DPRK’s national strategy under Kim Jong Il. The term 
kangsŏngdaeguk first appeared in the North Korean media in August 1998 in reference to Kim 
Jong Il having provided “on-the-spot guidance” in Chagang Province in February 1998.[11] At first 
glance, a strong and prosperous country should be prominent or successful in everything, but 
North Korea focuses on four areas: ideology, politics, the military, and the economy.[12] The 
North Korean leadership apparently believes the country is strong in terms of ideology and 
politics because the society has been indoctrinated for decades with the juche ideology of Kim Il 
Sung. Although the military balance has worsened for the DPRK, Pyongyang nevertheless is 
probably confident the military is strong given the implementation of son’gun chŏngch’i and the 
expansion of the country’s “nuclear deterrent.”[13]  
In the economic realm, the North Korean leadership acknowledges weakness, and Kim Jong Il 
has promoted himself as a tech-savvy modernizer dedicated to leading the country out of 
backwardness. The country introduced a package of economic reforms on July 1, 2002 that were 
targeted more at the microeconomic level than previous adjustments in economic policy. While 
the debate continues over the success or failure of these reforms, the regime has stressed that 
foreign capital and technology, as well as access to foreign markets, are necessary to achieve 
economic recovery and sustained growth. This realization has led Pyongyang to reassess its 
relations with the outside world, including its relations with Washington.  
North Korea’s Policy towards the United States 
North Korea’s foreign policy towards the United States has been shaped by the bitter experience 
of the Korean War and the DPRK’s position in the bipolar Cold War. The DPRK detested the 
United States for having thwarted Kim Il Sung’s effort to unite Korea by military force, and for the 
devastation unleashed by U.S. Air Force bombing campaigns during the war.[14] North Korea 
has utilized the war experience to indoctrinate the population with anti-Americanism and to justify 
the state’s frequent warnings that a U.S. attack or invasion is imminent.[15]  
During the Cold War, the DPRK was vehemently opposed to the United States, which was 
depicted as the driving force behind imperialism and exploitive international capitalism. This view 
was compounded by the Korean War experience and the deep resentment over Washington’s 
intervention, which Pyongyang has considered as an obstruction of Korean unification. There was 
little contact between the two countries during the Cold War, except for periodic clashes between 
the two militaries in areas surrounding the DPRK.[16] North Korea’s main foreign policy objective 
towards the United States during this period was to split the U.S.-ROK alliance and to effect the 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces in South Korea.[17] To deter the United States from intervening 
in Korea again, the DPRK established formal alliances with the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China when North Korea signed “treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance” with the two countries in July 1961. 
Many American analysts and policymakers perceived North Korean relations with China and the 
USSR to be close during the Cold War, but the relationships actually were quite volatile, which 
caused Pyongyang to question the commitments of its alliance partners. Pyongyang’s doubts 
about the credibility of its security alliances led the regime under Kim Il Sung to seek an 
independent arms production capability as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
ballistic missiles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s normalization of relations with 
South Korea led Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear weapons development program in the early 
1990s and to reassess its security relationship with the outside world, particularly with 
Washington and Tokyo.  
For North Korea, the United States plays a critical role in Pyongyang’s efforts to achieve its 
national objectives. U.S. cooperation is necessary to achieve both security and economic goals, 
but Washington’s indifference or refusal to cooperate with Pyongyang has left North Koreans 
frustrated and aggrieved. In the security realm, the DPRK since the early 1990s has sought 
negative security assurance from the United States. The DPRK’s request has been reflected in a 
number of written documents,[18] but Pyongyang cites the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, 
economic sanctions, military exercises, President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” reference in his 
2002 State of the Union Address, in addition to other activities and statements as evidence that 
the United States has a “hostile policy aimed at strangling the DPRK.”  
Given North Korea’s weakness and threat perceptions, Pyongyang feels it has no choice but to 
strengthen its military capabilities to deter the United States. The dilemma for the DPRK is that its 
security policy towards the United States alienates Washington and decreases the likelihood of 
mutual cooperation in the economic realm, which Pyongyang desperately is seeking to achieve 
its economic objectives. The DPRK can never be secure with a hostile United States, but 
Pyongyang feels it has very little or no control over Washington’s posture.  
The contradiction in the DPRK’s policy towards the United States is that its security and economic 
policies are irreconcilable. Pyongyang realizes that U.S. cooperation is necessary for the 
successful implementation of economic reforms based on an outward economic orientation. 
However, DPRK leaders seem to believe that Washington is intrinsically hostile, and that 
Pyongyang’s security policy has no bearing on Washington’s “hostile policy.” 
Pyongyang expected the 1994 Agreed Framework to change the overall nature of the U.S.-DPRK 
bilateral relationship, but Washington viewed the agreement in much narrower terms—as a 
mechanism to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Dissatisfaction with the agreement’s 
implementation reinforced those in Pyongyang who were skeptical of U.S. credibility, which 
probably led to the DPRK hedging with a clandestine uranium enrichment program. The 
disclosure of the uranium enrichment program in 2002, and the DPRK’s acknowledgment and 
subsequent denial of such a program, have seriously damaged any credibility Pyongyang had in 
Washington, making a negotiated diplomatic settlement to the North Korean nuclear issue 
extremely difficult.  
In sum, for as long as Kim Jong Il remains in power, North Korea likely will pursue a national 
strategy based upon the concepts of sŏn’gun chŏngch’i and kangsŏngdaeguk. To achieve state 
objectives under these ideologies, Pyongyang will have to seek conflicting and contradictory 
goals in its relationship with the United States. In the security realm, the DPRK will seek the 
capability to deter the United States, the termination of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the withdrawal 
of U.S. military forces in South Korea. Pyongyang will also continue to seek negative security 
assurances in various forms, including a Korean War peace treaty, to serve its national objectives.  
The paradox in North Korean policy towards the United States lies in the economic realm. In 
contrast to Pyongyang’s ceaseless and shrill rhetoric against Washington regarding security 
matters, the DPRK would like to improve bilateral relations in order to obtain U.S. cooperation in 
the economic sphere. In particular, Pyongyang wants to be removed from the State Department’s 
list of states that sponsor international terrorism, and have all U.S. sanctions removed so that the 
DPRK can join international financial institutions in order to gain access to foreign capital and 
overseas markets. For as long as U.S. sanctions remain in place, Pyongyang will blame them for 
the nation’s economic problems; perversely, the sanctions serve the interests of the political elite 
since they provide a scapegoat for the economy’s poor performance. The DPRK has been trying 
to achieve these conflicting goals in its policy towards the U.S. for over a decade without success, 
and is unlikely to achieve success in the near future. 
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